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Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, 
but also functionality in the sense of the  dependency on physical conditions of natural 
entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional 
property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman pa-
radox – with the consequence, that the behavior of things seems to be completely at the 
mercy of change of unique unrepeatable temporal points. It is exactly this (mis-
)understanding that also generated the induction problem. From the intrinsic connection 
between universality and functionality, however, – that is my claim – the ontological 
consequence of a nature results, for which lawfulness is coupled to essentially functio-
nally defined time sequences – thereby implying a potentiality dimension of nature, too. 
These considerations are explained in the following six points:  
 
1. Introduction  
2. The Goodman Paradox  
3. Concerning Attempts at Solutions of Goodman's Paradox  
4. Goodman's Neglect of the Functionality Aspect  
5. Function-related Determinations 




There are two main elements in the concept of natural law: on the one hand, 
the claim of universal, i.e. overall spatio-temporal validity, which in nature cor-
responds to the character of spatio-temporal uniformity; on the other hand, the func-
tional character of natural phenomena, which results from their dependence on spe-
cific conditions and thus represents something like a dimension of possibility or po-
tentiality of natural being. Both moments – universality and functionality1 on the le-
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1 From a formal point of view it has to be considered, that according to the doubled respect of 
universality and functionality two forms of inductive generalization have to be distinguished. As an 
example the law of gravitation is considered: On the one hand, there is the all-statement: ''The condi-
tional structure formulated in the law of gravity exists at all places and at all times' (universality); 
on the other hand, there is also an all-statement, but of the form: 'The conditional structure formula-
ted in the law of gravity exists for all distances between two given masses' (functionality). The diffe-
rence is obvious: In the first case the all-operator refers to different world regions and times (univer-
sality), in the second case however to different distances in the same world region and time (functio-
nality). 
While the empiricist oriented theory of science did not consider the first-mentioned way of 
generalization to be legitimate, i.e. the aspect of universality, because of the limitations of experien-
 2 
vel of description or uniformity and potentiality as characters of nature itself – obvi-
ously belong together essentially. In the mathematical formulation of the laws of na-
ture this is expressed in the fact that they take the form of universal functional laws, 
which are indeed of paramount importance for science.  
It is all the more surprising that the analytical theory of science has in fact ma-
de the moment of universality of the laws of nature a central theme, but has practi-
cally completely omitted functionality.2 This is undoubtedly also connected with the 
fact that it has primarily considered qualitative statements of the kind: 'All swans are 
white', 'All emeralds are green', 'All metals are conductive', etc.3 Since this is not 
specifically justified, one can only speculate about the motives. For the normal type 
of science theorist, unfamiliarity with scientific practice should be ruled out as well 
as a rejection of the mathematical form of science. A possible reason is the simple 
predicate logical formalizability of qualitative law-like statements. Of course, the 
concept of function can be formalized as well, admittedly with considerable additio-
nal effort. Howsoever – one must conclude that the aspect of functionality is basical-
ly not considered central. 
Now, functionality, as already mentioned, refers to dependency on conditions 
and thus to the potentiality or dispositional character of natural entities. In connecti-
on with the problem of theoretical and dispositional concepts, this character has 
been discussed by the analytical philosophy of science, but, as can be seen, with a 
defensive tendency, as it were, i.e. with the intention of getting rid of the question, 
which in an empirical attitude remains aporetic. 
The fact, however, that it has serious consequences for the concept of the law 
of nature, if the character of functionality is suppressed and the law concept thereby 
is reduced to the moment of universality, is to be demonstrated in the following at 
the example of the so-called Goodman paradox, which is to be considered and ana-
lyzed therefore now in more detail. As will be shown, a paradox indeed arises preci-
sely because the functional character of natural laws is neglected. 
 
  2. The Goodman Paradox 
 
Goodman's considerations4 tie in with Hume's critique of the concept of causa-
lity: According to Hume, our ideas of causality and natural lawfulness are based so-
lely on the experience of regularities of natural events, which subjectively leads to 
the formation of a habit of expecting such regularities in the future. The fact that 
subjective expectations of this kind cannot guarantee anything for the objective 
course of nature leads to the induction problem. However, this does not prevent 
scientists from inductively deducing future events from past experience. The fact 
that copper so far has always proved to be conductive is expected to be the case in 
                                                                                                                                               
ce, the second form of generalization, concerning the functional character of the laws of nature, 
should not be less suspect from an empiricist perspective because always only singular measuring 
points can be determined empirically – in the example: individual values of the gravitational force 
for the respective distances of the masses – while the functional law includes all values of force for 
all distances: This, too, is a form of universality, here in the sense of completeness, which as such 
can never be achieved by experience. 
2 See for example Hempel (1974); Hempel indeed mostly chooses quantitative functional laws 
as examples, without, however, thematizing the functional character; see also Nagel, E. (1961); Na-
gel lists the functional laws only as one type among others, see 77 f. 
3 Properly understood, qualitative provisions are also based on functional structures. For ex-
ample, emeralds are probably green under 'normal conditions', but at high temperatures and pressu-
res they (presumably) change their color – howsoever: According to the basic dependence on condi-
tions of all natural entities these inevitably own functional character. 
4 Goodman, N. (1975). 
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the future as well, in other words: 'Conductive' is considered a 'law-like' predicate, 
i.e. one that entitles to induction and can thus be 'continued' into the future – natural-
ly with the reservation of Hume that this method is only founded on past regularities 
and is therefore only hypothetical for the future. But in the practice of science (and 
also in our everyday actions) this procedure is common and efficient.5  
Goodman adopts Hume's approach without questioning it in principle.6 When 
he nevertheless criticizes Hume's interpretation, this is directed against his under-
standing of regularities, which he considers too undifferentiated: Hume's view that 
"regularities produce habits generated in experience, to expect something" is to be 
overlooking the fact that this can not be generally asserted, namely since "some re-
gularities produce such habits, but others do not; that predictions based on certain 
regularities are justified, but not if they are based on others", (Goodman 1975, p. 
107). Goodman explains this by means of drastic examples, which, in order to have 
a clearly defined starting point, will first be given here: "The fact that a given piece 
of copper conducts the electric current increases the credibility of statements that 
other pieces of copper conduct the current, and this confirms the hypothesis that all 
copper conducts the current. But the fact that a certain man who is now in this room 
is a third son does not increase the credibility of statements that other men who are 
now in the room are also third sons, and thus does not confirm the hypothesis that all 
men who are now in the room are third sons. But in both cases our hypothesis is a 
generalization of the data statement. The difference is that in the first case the hypo-
thesis is a law-like statement, while in the second case it is just a random general 
statement ... Obviously we have to look for a possibility to distinguish law-like from 
random statements" (Goodman 1975, p. 97). "Hume's most modern successors," so 
Goodman, "have recognized and treated this problem just as little as he himself" (p. 
108), namely the question under which conditions regularities entitle to induction 
and when not. Goodman calls this "the new riddle of induction" (p. 97). 
Another striking example illustrates Goodman's problem in terms of time: 
"Every word you have heard me speak here preceded the last sentence of this lectu-
re, but that does not, I hope, raise the expectation that every word you will hear will 
precede this sentence" (Goodman 1975, p. 107). Here again, the underlying regulari-
ty is problematic: Indeed, all the words of that lecture have in common the characte-
ristic that they precede the last sentence of it. But why can we not conclude from 
this that this applies to all words of the lecturer, while the analogous conclusion in 
the case of the conductive copper pieces is correct? – a certainly surprising, but ne-
vertheless legitimate question that demands a clear answer, although it is astonishing 
that this question has not been asked by empiricism itself or by its critics.  
The whole paradox of Goodman's question becomes apparent in the well-
known emerald example: The fact that green emeralds are repeatedly observed sup-
ports the hypothesis that all emeralds are green. This is the normal induction proce-
dure practiced by science. Goodman now defines a very artificial predicate by sta-
ting that something should be called gred if it turns out to be green when examined 
before time t0 or red when examined after time t0 (Goodman 1975, p. 98). Notice 
that according to this definition it is gred all the time before and after (from) t0. For 
the induction the following situation results: The observation of green emeralds be-
fore t0 supports the hypothesis that all emeralds are gred according to the definition 
of 'gred'. After t0 this would mean that all emeralds are red, with other words: The 
                                                 
5 The not unjustified criticism of such an 'inductivist' understanding of empirical science, as 
pointed out by Popper, for example, can be left out of consideration here, because the following is 
not primarily concerned with an adequate concept of science, but with clarifying the concept of 're-
gularity'. 
6 On the criticism of Hume's position see Wandschneider, D. (1986), pp. 131–142. 
 4 
observation of many green emeralds before t0 accordingly justifies the expectation 
that after t0 only emeralds are found that are not green – a truly paradoxical form of 
induction, which obviously is not permissible in this form: A predicate like 'gred' is 
indeed based on a 'regularity', which is similar to the abnormal one as in the previ-
ous examples. Such a predicate, so Goodman, cannot be a 'law-like' predicate. Such 
can only be a predicate, which can be "justifiably continued", i.e. inductively trans-
ferred from past to future cases (Goodman 1975, p. 119; see also p. 110 ff). 
 
3. Concerning Attempts at Solutions of Goodman's Paradox 
 
The 'new riddle of induction' that becomes visible here has especially put the 
inductivist view, as it was advocated by R. Carnap, into distress.  For this reason 
alone, Goodman's paradox has repeatedly been the subject of intense discussion. The 
numerous attempts to solve the paradox proposed in this context have, however, re-
mained unsatisfactory – in the following I would like to mention only a few points. 
If Goodman's paradox is taken into consideration here once again, it is primarily be-
cause, as already mentioned, it demonstrates that the concept of natural law cannot 
be reduced to the moment of universality and that paradox arises precisely because 
the other moment, that of functionality, is suppressed. But first some short hints to 
various proposals for solutions:7  
It is interesting to note that non-law-like predicates à la Goodman are defined 
by reference to individual places, times, objects, events, so that it is obvious to look 
for this as the reason of the non-continuability of such predicates.8 Kutschera, on the 
other hand, just refers to predicates of this kind like 'arctic', 'earthly', etc. (1972, I, p. 
146). Thus, so Kutschera, it can be asserted, for example, that nitrogen is gaseous 
under the conditions of the earthly atmosphere: an obviously law-like hypothesis, 
although it refers to the singular object 'earth'. This objection will be discussed later. 
The criticism of M. Hesse,9 referred to by Kutschera, that the mixed use of 
non-law-like and law-like predicates in the context of physical theories leads to in-
compatibilities is self-evident, because it basically only repeats the doctrine of 
Goodman's paradox: that predicates like 'gred' have paradoxical consequences in 
comparison with 'normal' law-like predicates. By the way, the distinguishability of 
law-like and non-law-like predicates is here already assumed, while the solution of 
the paradox requires a criterion for it. 
Goodman's own approach is also not very convincing. Law-like predicates are 
'continueable' predicates according to Goodman's usage of language (see above), but 
do we also have criteria for continueability? Goodman says (with reference to 'green' 
and 'gred') that one has to "consider the balance of the previous continuations of the 
two predicates. With 'green', which can refer to older and much more numerous con-
tinuations than 'gred', it turns out more impressive. The predicate 'green', so we want 
to say, is much better anchored than the predicate 'gred'" (Goodman 1975, p. 121). 
Kutschera rightly points here to the merely pragmatic-historical character of the 'an-
choring' of a predicate, which thus cannot be a justification for the continuability of 
predicates. And what applies to newly introduced law-like predicates, which are not 
yet linguistically anchored at the beginning – quite apart from the problems of ma-
king the anchoring balance comprehensible at all (Kutschera 1972, I, p. 149 ff)? Ac-
cording to Kutschera, this approach to a solution must therefore also be considered 
"hopeless" (1972, I, p. 155). 
                                                 
7 See the detailed description in Kutschera (1972), Vol. I, p. 141 ff. 
8 See e.g. Carnap, R. (1952/53), p. 311–318 and Will, U. (1985), p. 40 ff. 
9 Kutschera (1972), I, p. 148. 
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Kutschera's conclusion is extremely skeptical: "In its new [sc. Goodman's] 
garment, the old Hume's riddle has lost hardly any of its significance.From the dis-
cussion about Goodman's paradox one can safely conclude that at present there is no 
promising idea for a general solution of the problem in the sense of a general criteri-
on for inducibility and interchangeability,10 and with a high probability that there is 
no such general solution" (I, p. 158 f.) 
After all, Kutschera himself attempts to "understand the origin and validity of 
the assumptions of interchangeability somewhat better" (1972, I, p. 159). He argues 
that the basic predicates of our language are from the outset linked to assumptions of 
inducibility, i.e. they must be treated as law-like predicates if they are to be under-
standable and learnable at all (I, p. 160). Such inducibility assumptions would thus 
have an "a priori" character, namely as "conditions of our understanding of langua-
ge" (I, p. 160). Seen in light, this also contains the ontological statement that the as-
sumption of a law-like nature is inevitable11 – undoubtedly an interesting conse-
quence of Kutscher's thinking. Admittedly, by the linguistic-relativistic restriction 
that inducibility assumptions are "not invariant to a change of the reference langua-
ge" (I, p. 160), Kutschera subsequently robs this idea of its punch line: In one lan-
guage, 'green', in the other language, however, a predicate like 'gred' is to be regar-
ded as law-like (I, p. 160 f.). One is probably not mistaken in the assumption that a 
completely different, paradoxical world then belonged to the latter language. 
As already mentioned, the Goodman construction still is to be critically revie-
wed in the following, because in the science-theoretical discussion of the problem, 
so it seems, a central point, namely the functionality aspect of natural laws, is over-
looked. 
 
4. Goodman's Neglect of the Functionality Aspect 
 
Let's look at the emerald example for simplicity's sake. What is immediately 
striking here is the reference to time in the definition of 'gred'. Is it responsible for 
the non-law-like character of the predicate? Well, there are also laws of nature 
which contain time determinations, namely laws of motion and process, so that the 
occurrence of a time determination does not exclude per se lawfulness. Is this case 
given in Goodman's example? 
This corresponds to the fact, that t0 is a single, historical moment, which is un-
repeatable as such. Thus a fact related to t0 indeed cannot be generalized: because t0 
is historically fixed in its unrepeatability, which of course does not apply to the 
points of time occurring in a process law. 
To illustrate the difference, let us consider the example of a bullet trajectory, t0 
being approximately the point in time when the trajectory reaches its highest point 
before it drops again. However, this is not a unique, immovably fixed historical 
point in time, but occurs in exactly the same way again and again during such balli-
stic movements.  It is therefore a time determination generally connected with this 
process and in this sense generalizable. 
On the other hand, a commitment to a historically unique point in time exists 
if, to consider a counter-example, certain tax benefits are only granted up to a cer-
tain date t0. It would be absurd to consider this possibility of tax concession as gene-
ralizable, because this would miss the sense of the time specification, which implies 
a limitation and thus non-continuability. Nevertheless: Don't we also have here the 
                                                 
10 The concept of event interchangeability going back to  B. de Finetti essentially means the 
independence of events from the time of their respective occurrence, which is obviously not the case 
for non-continuable predicates like "gred". 
11 For this also Wandschneider (1986). 
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more general Goodman problem, which is related to the concept of regularity: Aren't 
the tax cases before t0 altogether similar in that they fall under that concession?  
Why should we not assume that the tax concession will also be granted in the future 
despite this regularity? Why is this regularity not continuable? Of course, because t0 
is an unrepeatable moment, which as such has the character of a border where so-
mething stops. But is it then allowed to speak of a 'regularity' at all? To clarify these 
questions, the relation between regularity and temporality is to be considered more 
closely. 
'Regularity' has in any case also the temporal sense, that a certain fact is reali-
zed regularly again and again, and thus appears in the same manner at different ti-
mes. The state of affairs can be of a temporal or non-temporal nature. 'S is green' 
contains e.g. no determination of time, but of course can be realized in the same way 
at different times and thus have the character of a regularity. But what is valid for 
specific temporal facts – think of the mentioned examples of a movement on the one 
hand and a tax-privilege with time limitation on the other hand? If the identical re-
peatability in time belongs to the concept of a regularity, so it is only possible to 
speak of a regularity concerning a state of affairs, if this can occur at different times 
basically again and again in the same way with these time determinations. So such a 
repeatability of the time determinations excludes each form of historical singularity, 
as it is given for instance in the case of a temporally limited tax benefit. 
This clarifies, I think, how to judge the 'regularities' pointed out by Goodman 
and why they do not entitle to induction: The fact, that an object is gred, represents 
due to the reference to t0 contained in the definition of 'gred' indeed a temporal fact; 
but as far as t0 is a historically unique point in time, the gred state cannot be a regu-
larity in the sense of a temporal fact, which can optionally be repeated in time. And 
exactly because of this reason 'gred' does not allow an inductive continuation into 
the future and thus is not a law-like predicate. 
Goodman and his successors have been mislead by the fact, that before t0 re-
peatedly states are realized, which are similar in the way, that they occur before t0, 
so that this 'pre- t0-occurrence' seems to have the character of a regularity. But the 
developed considerations make clear, why this is not the case: 'pre- t0-occurrence' as 
a temporal fact could only be a regularity, if the essential time determination t0 
could be repeated identically in time, which, as intended, is not true; neither in the 
other Goodman example of the lecture, whose words are similar in the fact, that they 
precede the last sentence of this lecture; nor in the case of the tax benefit, which is 
granted for all tax cases before a certain point of time, but not beyond that: There-
with each time is referred to a unique point in time, so that there can be no temporal 
fact that is optionally identically repeatable. 
What is to be understood more closely by a temporal fact which can be repea-
ted identically in time, can be explained again by the example of the trajectory of a 
bullet: Such a movement is obviously a repeatable temporal fact, insofar as the time 
determinations can be assigned to corresponding movement phases, i.e. with a simi-
lar repetition of the movement also its characteristic time course is reproduced iden-
tically. The trajectory first rises, reaches its highest point at a certain time t0, and 
then falls back again. In this respect, it is strictly speaking not reasonable to say that 
the bullet trajectory reaches its maximum at time t0. More correctly it has to be said, 
that it reaches this maximum after a certain duration of flight t0 (calculated from the 
time of firing), in other words: In a repeatable time determination the time counting 
does not start at the birth of Christ, but as it were again and again anew, namely 
when the underlying repeatable temporal fact, i.e. a certain typical motion process, 
at all any form of a determined process, starts anew. The determination of time here 
is not the general, historical time, but has something to do with the process itself, i.e. 
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with the time function of the law of process. In this sense I would like to speak brie-
fly of a function-related time determination, and with this wording it can be said that 
a function-related time determination is a repeatable, i.e. generalizable time deter-
mination. Function related time determinations represent as it were 'phases' of a law 
of progression with a characteristic time function. 
If these considerations are applied analogously to place determinations, then 
that other Goodman example also loses its seemingly paradoxical meaning: that a 
man in this room is a third son does not justify the expectation that all men in this 
room are third sons: because and insofar there is normally no functional relationship 
between a room and the characteristic of being a third son. A common room and the 
men in it usually do not form a functional system, even if such a thing remains con-
ceivable in principle.12  
 
5. Function-related Determinations 
 
Functional determinations, as they are recognized here as essential for the pro-
perty of generalizability, reflect specific behavioral laws of a system, thus having 
their reason in its function. Considered in this way, Goodman's concept of the an-
choring of a predicate could be connected with a good sense: Not the frequency, 
with which this was used so far as a law-like predicate, is decisive – here indeed 
would be to ask, with which right a predicate then is introduced for the first time as 
law-like –, but rather the circumstance, that it is usable according to its functional 
sense for the characterization of time-repeatable processes of the same kind: 'ancho-
ring' thus not in the usage of language, but in the functional fact, to which the usage 
of language refers. In this respect, the concept of 'anchoring' probably means so-
mething correct – exactly what has been called here the generalizability of function-
related determinations – without, however, adequately explicating this state of af-
fairs. 
The already mentioned view that the reference to contingent, individual-unique 
points in time, places, objects, events is to be understood as the actual reason for the 
occurrence of Goodman's paradox on the one hand seems so  applicable. On the 
other hand it is important to see, that such cases remain untouched, which concern 
individual predicates like 'earthly', 'arctic' etc., as long as they are used in the sense 
of function-related and therefore generalizable predicates. How appearance can de-
ceive in this respect may be demonstrated by the example of the predicate 'earthly', 
which obviously refers to the individual object 'earth' and seems to exclude a law-
like usage in this respect. But a sentence already stated above of the kind: 'In the 
earthly atmosphere nitrogen is gaseous' is, scientifically understood, not a statement 
about an individual fact, but is to say, that nitrogen is always gaseous under conditi-
ons of the type of the earthly atmosphere. Here the behavior of nitrogen under cer-
tain conditions is formulated, which in turn are characterized by recourse to an uni-
que object (earth). These conditions, however are not inextricably bound to earth, 
they can basicly also be realized otherwhere and at a different time and therefore are 
generalizable. 'Earthly' is thus only used as an an exemplification of a function-
related determination, which as such can be generalized. 
Here the question must arise: If generalizability (in the sense of inductive con-
tinuability) excludes the reference to actual unique determinations, and such a refe-
rence is clearly given in the case of the predicate 'gred' – why then could the impres-
                                                 
12 In hotels (before each room had tv) there were occasionally rooms for the various television 
programs: In this case, therefore, there was (by convention) indeed a functional assignment of rooms 
and the people who wanted to watch a particular program. 
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sion of a paradox arise in this respect at all? Now, gred does indeed refer to the uni-
que, unrepeatable time t0, which means a time limit (similar to the case of the tax al-
lowance, which is no longer granted after t0). At the same time, however, gred is de-
fined in such a way that it seems to remain unaffected by this time limit: Something 
is gred for all times, if it is green before t0 or red after (from) t0: Although the defi-
nition of 'gred' refers to an individual, unrepeatable point in time t0, the fulfillment 
of this predicate – due to the clever 'overarching' definition using 'or' – does not 
seem to include a time limit. This only becomes visible, if the fulfillment of the pre-
dicate 'gred' has to be checked in the execution of induction and for this purpose the 
defining conditions ('green' or 'red') have to be considered: That these are different 
at different times means for induction, that at different times different things are to 
expect, while the actual sense of induction is to expect the same thing at different 
times. This immanent contradiction in the predicate 'gred', which on the one hand 
includes a temporal limitation by its reference to a unique point in time t0, but ne-
vertheless reaches beyond t0 by its definition, is what has led to the idea of a para-
dox here, or in other words: The fact that the time-spanning identity of a predicate 
like 'gred' nevertheless excludes a time-spanning identity of the state of affairs cha-
racterized by it (before or after t0) probably represents the actual scandalon from 
Goodman's point of view. 
At the same time, it reflects an understanding of natural lawfulness that is one-
sidedly oriented towards qualitative law-like statements: Emeralds have always been 
green and will continue to be green in the future. So the only characteristic of natu-
ral law seems to be the property of identity. The time-bridging meaning of 'gred' 
seems to correspond to this on the one hand, but on the other hand not, as it involves 
non-identity ('green' before t0 or 'red' after t0), which, in the sense of qualitative natu-
ral laws, would be equivalent to the breaking of lawfulness: 'Gred' corresponds to 
and contradicts this understanding of natural lawfulness in equal measure. 
An additional irritation in this context results from the correct intuition that 
non-identity is not to be necessarily understood as incompatible with natural lawful-
ness, as far as it includes also functionality and thus change of state, as e.g. temporal 
laws of progression show. The fact that changing states follow each other in a de-
terminate way is characteristic for a process law, thus it does not imply a breaking of 
lawfulness. The temporally changing states represent a moment of non-identity, 
which is nevertheless compatible with time-invariant identity: not as a negation of 
the change, but on the one hand as the identical functional law of change underlying 
the change, and on the other hand, as has become clear in the example of the trajec-
tory of the projectile, as an identical repetition of the overall change itself at another 
time (i.e. as a renewed instantiation of the functional law) – it will soon become 
clear that both are intrinsically connected. This is exactly what is meant by the con-
cept of the regularity of a process. Under the aspect of the concept of function, the 
non-identity of temporally different states in terms of their lawfulness needs not to 
be irritating. But then time determinations like t0 would not be seen as singular 
marks but as function-related, repeatable determinations which as such are basicly 
generalizable.13  
In the form of Goodman's paradox, we are dealing, as it were,  with two inter-
locking aporias: On the one hand, the time-spanning identity of the predicate 'gred' 
seems paradoxical, because it nevertheless includes non-identity of the facts charac-
terized by it. On the other hand, non-identity, as explained, is compatible with natu-
                                                 
13 Precisely this point has often been completely overlooked in Goodman-critiques, which 
rightly name the reference to time in 'gred' as the reason for the paradox; as an example for many, 
see Barker/Achinstein (1974). 
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ral lawfulness – namely in the sense of function-related determinations – but this ca-
se is not given here, because the singular, historically unique time determination t0 
in the definition of 'gred' does not fit to it. This doubly paradoxical character of 
'gred', as has been shown, is ultimately based on a misdefinition of the relationship 
between identity and non-identity in the concept of natural lawfulness, which in turn 
is mainly connected with the neglect of its functional character: This is the revenge 
for the fact that scientific-theoretical analysis has limited itself to qualitative state-
ments of the kind: 'emeralds are green' and has basically ignored the quantitative-
functional aspect of natural lawfulness.14  
Please note: In the Goodman framework defined here it was a matter of delimi-
ting predicates that were 'continuable' in time and in this sense inductively generali-
zable, i.e. 'law-like', from the non-generalizable predicates constructed by Goodman 
and to find a criterion for this distinction. Only such a structural distinction was in-
tended here. The fundamental ontological problem of an inherently lawful nature 
thus is of course in no way decided. The result achieved so far only says: Predicates 
that can be generalized inductively are equivalent to function-related determinations. 
The induction problem itself, i.e. the deeper-lying empiricist problem of the spatio-
temporal universal validity of natural laws, is not the actual topic here. 
 Nevertheless, the mentioned result already contains indications for a more ade-
quate than the empiricist understanding of natural laws and induction: The fact that 
the natural being has a functional character also means that its behavior depends on 
physical conditions and not on pure time. The fact that copper conducts electricity is 
based on the electron configuration of its crystal structure and, for this very reason, 
has nothing to do with any date in time, and it is precisely for this reason that copper 
has not only been conductive in the past, but will continue to be so in the future. The 
natural being 'hangs', as it were, in the net of its conditions; it exists only by virtue 
of these conditions. But this then also means: Always – whenever – its conditions 
are given, it is itself likewise realized, in other words: If the context of conditions is 
in this way constitutive for the natural being, then its constitution cannot be affected 
by time purely as such; it has a temporally universal character or behaves lawfully. 
The doubt about the possibility of time-bridging laws of nature – the induction pro-
blem – stems, seen in this light, from a fetishization of the abstract temporal change 
with simultaneous neglect of the functional character and thus of the condition-
dependency of natural being.15  
 
6. Relationship between Universality and Functionality 
 
Without going into further detail here, it is clear that the concept of natural law 
cannot be adequately grasped if the aspect of functionality remains unconsidered, in 
other words: Lawfulness cannot be reduced to one of the two moments of natural 
law stated above, its spatio-temporal universality. The example of Goodman's para-
dox shows in a particularly drastic way that even the meaning of law-like universali-
ty – since this is what the question of inductive generalizability aims at – is decisive-
ly misunderstood as long as the functional character of natural law is not taken into 
account. This leads to the assumption that universality and functionality are not in-
dependent of each other, but are moments essentially belonging together of the natu-
ral-scientific concept of lawfulness. If this is so, then the question of the relationship 
between universality and functionality must also be asked.  
This question shall not be investigated in detail here, just a short note: In the 
                                                 
14 For this see footnote 3. 
15 For this see Wandschneider (1986) and Wandschneider (1998), pp. 369–382. 
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previous paragraph it was already mentioned that a function-related time determina-
tion is, strictly speaking, a duration, mathematically: a time interval – in the exam-
ple of the trajectory of a bullet, for example, it is a time interval, calculated from the 
time of firing. Mathematically, we are dealing with functions f(t–t0), which depend 
on time differences t–t0. If the projectile is fired, under otherwise identical conditi-
ons, at a later time t0', which is shifted by the amount  of time, the function 
 
f(t'– t0') = f((t+)–(t0+)) = f(t–t0) 
 
and thus exactly the same time dependence as before the time shift, in short: functi-
on related time determinations are mathematical time differences, which as such are 
invariant to shifts in time. Analogously can be argued concerning function related 
space determinations. Accordingly functionalities depending on function related 
space and time determinations are invariant to shifts in space and time, and this in-
variance is nothing else than the mathematical formulation of its spatio-temporal 
universal character. 
The simple example shows that the two moments of natural lawfulness high-
lighted above – universality and functionality – are by no means independent of each 
other. Rather, the functionality of natural lawfulness implicitly includes its spatio-
temporal universality, and vice versa: Without reference to the functionality of the 
law of nature, no statement about its universality is possible. It is therefore not sur-
prising that the neglect of the functional aspect in the context of analytical philo-
sophy of science has increased the notorious difficulties of empiricism with respect 
to the universality of natural laws almost into the paradox, as has become clear, for 
example, from the appearance of Goodman's aporia. 
The two moments of natural law on the descriptive level – universality and 
functionality – correspond, however, as already noted at the beginning, on the onto-
logical level, to the moments of uniformity and potentiality as characteristics of na-
ture itself. The developed argumentation, according to which universality and func-
tionality intrinsically belong together, has a direct natural-ontological consequence: 
If nature behaves uniformly, i.e. in the sense of universal laws of function, then po-
tentiality is an essential part of its being. Indeed, the functional character of the laws 
of nature expresses that being natural is what it is, always depending on conditions, 
and that means: it contains possibilities, dispositions, which are realized under spe-
cific conditions.16 Biological evolution, which brings to light, as it were, immanent 
possibilities of natural being, is in this respect a grandiose example staged by nature 
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